Monat: Juli 2015

Customers First, Then Partners

An Open Letter to Satya Nadella

Dear Satya Nadella,

I am sitting in my hotel room in Orlando looking forward to the opening of the Microsoft World Partner Conference today, Monday. The time difference and jetlag have left me unable to get a wink of sleep—and thinking about Microsoft’s future is hardly conducive to sleeping easily…

And yet—to begin with—I am truly impressed by how Microsoft has changed already on your watch as Chief Executive Officer. The slogan “Cloud First, Mobile First” is in my option fundamentally right. I would like to add to it my personal conviction that without mobile there is no cloud computing.

I would further like to add, however, that without a clear vision for the partners in the Microsoft ecosphere there can be no success for Microsoft. That is why this year’s WPC may well be the most important ever. The classic sales streams that were a result of the predominant PC business are starting to dry up. The course corrections toward “Cloud First, Mobile First” that you have ushered in came not a moment too soon. What now matters is to implement them, and that requires a common vision for Microsoft, customers and partners.

This vision is not necessarily apparent. At present, every partner must find his own way to the cloud. The maps that exist are, as yet, inadequate. One point is clear, however. There is an obstacle on the road to the cloud that both Microsoft and its partners must surmount. It is the “Vale of Tears” that lasts for around three disappointing fiscal years.

The road to the cloud is not merely a technical and not merely a marketing adventure. It is, above all, an accounting challenge due to the change of business model from license sales to rental revenues that it involves. In the first quarters rental revenue comes nowhere near to offsetting the downturn in license sales. Until now we have all been able to decide when we embark on the journey through this vale. It now looks as though the market is making this decision for us. Falling sales figures in the PC segment are already showing Microsoft that this is what is happening.

But for many partners—always assuming that they have accumulated sufficient reserves to survive this journey through the Vale of Tears—what actually awaits them at the other end of the vale is still not at all clear. Where are the sources of revenue in a cloudified world? How can existing solution portfolios be carried over into the new world—and with them the customers?

These are questions to which this WPC must provide answers. Instead, what we have heard in the run-up is irritating news. Pricing policy for SQL Server licenses is a case in point. In Germany alone around 200 software partners have marketed 400 to 500,000 SQL Server licenses. As a rule they have been the less expensive runtime version that will no longer be available for the cloud. What this means for customers and partners is that they will not only no longer be able to transfer existing on-premises solutions to the cloud one-to-one; they will also have to switch to a much more expensive version. That alone would use up the cost benefit that going for the cloud is supposed to provide. What we need, in contrast, are functional arguments arising from additional services that are available from the cloud. And that is precisely where a common vision has so far been missing.

That is why we partners have developed a cloud maturity model. Starting from the customer’s current usage situation, it envisions a step-by-step road to the cloud that offers the user additional benefit with each step. It begins with the transition from on-premises to the cloud—partly as a hybrid solution. Then comes additional functionality, such as for mobile use, in the form of cloud services that third parties can provide. Finally, there is the full transition to a service-oriented architecture. Only on the basis of a growth model of this kind that enables customers and partners to cost the transition to the cloud in the first place can the transition succeed.

SAP with Business by Design and IBM with its cloud activities failed not least because they were unable to offer their partners a comparable vision. Are we now about to hear one from you, Satya Nadella? I sincerely hope so for all our sakes.

We need a vision that implements “Cloud First, Mobile First” for the entire ecosphere. And then we must spread it. First to the customers and then to the Partners.

Sincerely Yours,

Heinz-Paul Bonn

AMD–Another Microsoft Device

History, they say, never repeats itself – except, perhaps, as a farce. That really does seem to be the case. A few hundred Bonnblogs ago we wondered what IBM was going to do with its war chest of around $100 bn and whether Big Blue would be able to catapult itself back into the centre of the IT action by means of acquisitions.

Now that Microsoft has a war chest of around $100 bn the question that constantly arises is which takeovers Redmond has in mind and why they might serve to bring Microsoft back to the centre of the cloud-based IT scene. The day before yesterday Salesforce was seen as a likely candidate for a Microsoft takeover; yesterday it was the microchip manufacturer AMD.

The two companies could hardly be more different.

Salesforce with its cloud-based CRM software is undermining established providers of sales support solutions and securing important sources of revenue. Oracle, SAP and indeed Microsoft are not achieving anywhere near the same growth rates in this market segment. It is a highflyer and there is talk of astronomically high takeover prices. The latest figure to be bandied about was a fabulous $60 billion price tag.

Advanced Micro Devices in contrast supplies the Who’s Who of the IT scene with chips and thereby secures important sources of revenue for them. AMD graphics or computing chips power Apple MacBooks, Sony’s PlayStation and Microsoft’s Xbox too. Yet the industry oldtimer is nonetheless valued most cautiously. The current price tag is a mere $1.26 bn.

That is little more than one per cent of Microsoft’s war chest and, conversely, the sum that Microsoft has to pay AMD annually for its Xbox microprocessors. So Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella could hardly go wrong by acquiring AMD, especially as competitors such as Sony or Apple would then face the alternative of either allowing Microsoft to participate in their business success via AMD or building up totally new supply chains.

But did Satya Nadella not just state in his mail to Microsoft employees that it isn’t a hardware company? Did he not repeat that it is a cloud first, mobile first organisation that has enough on its plate to see its own PC business safely into the cloud? Nadella owes his well-filled war chest to the PC product business, which accounts for 40 per cent of Microsoft sales and three quarters of Microsoft profits. The challenge must then surely be to keep Microsoft’s profitability high despite lower future profit margins from the cloud. What that requires cost reductions and not cost drivers like in-house chip production.

The problem for all established companies that are preparing for the cloud is that they have grown large and fat on an inflow of dollars from the licence business, whereas companies like Salesforce, Amazon or Facebook, which have lived under the cloud from the outset, are lean and streamlined in their positioning. Their partner structure is totally different too and does not rely on the traditional cascade model in which the manufacturer, the consultant and the implementer share the licence cake.

They, in contrast, live on complex and multi-faceted relationships between platform and service, between offerings that strengthen each other and on a market presence that builds up reciprocally. They use the dynamics of the cloud rather than the statics of co-marketing. How difficult this has become for Microsoft is indicated by the latest poll of partners, 25 per cent of whom said that Microsoft was their most important supplier, but 70 per cent see Microsoft merely as an important partner among many. The old binding mechanisms no longer work.

IBM also underwent – and suffered from – this trend. After all of its acquisitions in recent years Armonk has been forced to realise that the company is still the same: IBM. Microsoft too will face the same experience, with or without Salesforce, with or without AMD. Change does not come from without and not by means of acquisitions. The transition to a flawless cloud company can only succeed from within and with products that pass on the company’s own heartbeat and that of its employees.

AMD would otherwise just be Another Microsoft Device. And that would really be money poured down the drain.

AMD – Another Microsoft Device

Geschichte, sagt man, wiederholt sich nicht – höchstens als Farce. So scheint es in der Tat zu sein. Vor einigen hundert Bonnblogs haben wir uns gefragt, was IBM wohl mit seiner Kriegskasse von rund 100 Milliarden Dollar anfangen wird, und ob Big Blue in der Lage sein wird, sich durch Zukäufe wieder ins Zentrum des IT-Geschehens zu katapultieren.

Jetzt, da Microsoft mit einer Kriegskasse von rund 100 Milliarden Dollar ausgestattet ist, stellt sich kontinuierlich die Frage, welche Übernahmen in Redmond geplant sind und warum sie geeignet sein könnten, Microsoft wieder ins Zentrum der Cloud-basierten IT-Szene zu rücken. Vorgestern war es Salesforce, das sich einer mutmaßlichen Übernahme durch Microsoft gegenübersah, gestern war es der Chip-Hersteller AMD.

Die beiden Companies könnten unterschiedlicher kaum sein.

Salesforce gräbt mit seiner Cloud-gestützten CRM-Software den etablierten Anbietern von Lösungen für die Vertriebsunterstützung wichtige Umsatzquellen ab – Oracle, SAP und auch Microsoft können nicht annährend mit ähnlichen Wachstumsraten in diesem Marktsegment aufwarten. Der Highflyer wird denn auch mit astronomischen Übernahmepreisen gehandelt – zuletzt standen sagenhafte 60 Milliarden Dollar auf dem Preisschild.

Advance Micro Devices dagegen beliefert das Who-is-Who der IT-Szene mit Prozessoren und sichert ihnen damit wichtige Umsatzquellen – in Apples MacBooks, in Sonys PlayStation und auch in Microsofts Xbox ticken die Grafik- beziehungsweise Rechenkekse. Der Oldtimer der Branche wird dennoch an der Börse äußerst zurückhaltend bewertet – auf dem aktuellen Preisschild stehen gerade mal 1,26 Milliarden Dollar.

Das ist kaum mehr als ein Prozent in Microsofts Kriegskasse und entspricht umgekehrt auch ungefähr dem Rechnungsbetrag, den Microsoft jährlich an AMD für die Lieferung der Xbox-Prozessoren überweisen muss. Der Microsoft-Chef Satya Nadella könnte also mit dem Kauf von AMD kaum etwas falsch machen, zumal er Konkurrenten wie Sony und Apple vor die Alternative stellen würde, künftig entweder Microsoft über AMD am eigenen Geschäftserfolg zu beteiligen oder sich völlig neue Lieferketten aufzubauen.

Aber hat Satya Nadella nicht eben noch in seiner Mail an die Mitarbeiter nahegelegt, dass  Microsoft keine Hardware-Company ist, sondern wiederholt, dass es sich um eine „Cloud First, Mobile First“-Organisation handelt, die genug damit zu tun habe, das eigene PC-Geschäft in die Cloud zu retten? In der Tat verdankt Nadella die gut gefüllte Kriegskasse dem Geschäft rund um die PC-Produkte, die für 40 Prozent des Umsatzes aber für drei Viertel des Gewinns stehen. Die Herausforderung dürfte darin bestehen, bei zukünftig geringeren Margen aus der Cloud die eigene Profitabilität hoch zu halten. Dazu sind Kostensenkungen notwendig, nicht aber Kostenfresser wie eine eigene Chipherstellung.

Tatsächlich ist das Problem aller etablierten Unternehmen, die sich auf die Cloud vorbereiten, dass sie mit einem aus dem Lizenzgeschäft gespeisten Dollarzufluss groß und fett geworden sind, während Unternehmen wie Salesforce, Amazon oder Facebook, die von Anfang an unter der Wolke lebten, schlank und stromlinienförmig aufgestellt sind. Auch ihre Partnerstruktur ist völlig anders aufgebaut und lebt nicht vom althergebrachten Kaskadenmodell, in dem der Lizenzkuchen aufgeteilt wird zwischen Hersteller, Berater und Implementierer.

Sie leben vielmehr von vielschichtigen Beziehungen zwischen Plattform und Service, zwischen einander verstärkenden Angeboten und sich aufschaukelnder Marktpräsenz. Sie nutzen die Dynamik der Cloud anstelle der Statik des Co-Marketings. Wie schwierig sich dies für Microsoft inzwischen gestaltet, zeigt eine aktuelle Umfrage unter Partnern, in der zwar 25 Prozent der Befragten sagen, dass Microsoft wichtigster Lieferant sei. 70 Prozent aber urteilen, dass Microsoft lediglich ein wichtiger Partner unter vielen wäre. Die alten Bindungsmechanismen funktionieren nicht mehr.

Diese Entwicklung musste auch IBM durchleben und durchleiden. Armonk hat nach all den Zukäufen in den vergangenen Jahren erkennen müssen, dass die Company am Ende immer noch die gleiche ist: IBM nämlich. Microsoft wird das mit oder ohne Salesforce, mit oder ohne AMD ebenfalls erfahren müssen. Der Wandel kommt nicht von außen und nicht durch Zukäufe. Die Transition in eine lupenreine Cloud-Company kann nur von innen heraus erfolgreich sein – mit Produkten, die den eigenen Herzschlag des Unternehmens und seiner Mitarbeiter weitergeben.

Sonst wäre AMD einfach nur ein Anderes Microsoft-Device. Und das wäre doch wirklich rausgeschmissenes Geld.